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Abstract
We study propositional logical systems arising from the language of Johansson’s minimal logic and obtained by
weakening the requirements for the negation operator. We present their semantics as a variant of neighbourhood
semantics. We use duality and completeness results to show that there are uncountably many subminimal logics. We
also give model-theoretic and algebraic definitions of filtration for minimal logic and show that they are dual to each
other. These constructions ensure that the propositional minimal logic has the finite model property. Finally, we define
and investigate bi-modal companions with non-normal modal operators for some relevant subminimal systems, and
give infinite axiomatizations for these bi-modal companions.
1. Introduction
Minimal propositional calculus (Minimalkalku¨l, denoted here as MPC) is the system obtained from the positive
fragment of intuitionistic propositional calculus (equivalently, positive logic [29]) by adding a unary negation operator
satisfying the so-called principle of contradiction (sometimes referred to as reductio ad absurdum, e.g., in [26]). This
system was introduced in this form by Johansson [20] in 1937 by discarding ex falso quodlibet from the standard
axioms for intuitionistic logic. The system proposed by Johansson has its roots in Kolmogorov’s formalization of
intuitionistic logic [22]. The axiomatization proposed by Johansson preserves the whole positive fragment and most
of the negative fragment of Heyting’s intuitionistic logic. As a matter of fact, many important properties of negation
provable in Heyting’s system remain provable (in some cases, in a slightly weakened form) in minimal logic.
In this work, we focus on propositional logical systems arising from the language of minimal logic and obtained
by weakening the requirements for the negation operator in a ‘maximal way’. More precisely, the bottom element of
the bounded lattice of logics considered here is the system where the unary operator ¬ (that we still call ‘negation’)
does not satisfy any conditions except for being functional. The top element of this lattice is minimal logic. We use
the term N-logic to denote an arbitrary logical system in this lattice. This setting is paraconsistent, in the sense that
contradictory theories do not necessarily contain all formulas.
In this paper we continue the study of N-logics started in [12, 13]. We investigate these logics from several
different perspectives. In Section 2 we give an algebraic and model-theoretic presentation of N-logics, and provide a
brief recap of the main duality and completeness results from [12]. We also review the semantics introduced for the
N-logics in [12, 13]—that we call N-semantics—and show that it is a variant of standard neighbourhood semantics.
In Section 3, we exploit these results to show that the lattice of N-logics has the cardinality of the continuum. The
proofs from this section are obtained by exporting and adapting techniques of [21, 19, 5].
Section 4 is devoted to a study of the method of filtration for the basic N-logic. Model-theoretic and algebraic
definitions of filtration are introduced and compared. This leads to the finite model property of the minimal logic.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the article by introducing (bi-)modal systems that are proved to play the role of modal
companions for N-logics. More precisely, the language of these systems contains a normal (namely, S4) modality
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resulting from the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic, and a non-normal modality resulting from the negation
operator. After characterizing these logics in terms of standard neighbourhood semantics, we continue using the
equivalent N-semantics. We then give a proof that the standard Go¨del translation of intuitionistic logic into S4 can be
extended to translations of certain N-logics into these bi-modal systems. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
use of non-normal modal operators in the context of the Go¨del translation. On the other hand, modal systems using a
mix of normal and non-normal modalities have been recently explored in the evidence-based semantics of epistemic
logic [1, 27].
2. Preliminaries
In this preliminary section we present the main technical tools that will be used throughout the paper. We start with
a brief introduction to the Kripke semantics of minimal logic (here called N-semantics), in line with the tradition of
intuitionistic logic. Later we present the algebraic semantics, and state some basic facts. In order to keep the structure
of the paper as simple as possible, we skip the broader and introductory account of the topic and refer the interested
reader to [12, 13]. For a proof-theoretic account, see [7].
Let L(Prop) be the propositional language, where Prop is a countable set of propositional variables, generated by
the following grammar:
p | ⊤ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ¬ϕ
where p ∈ Prop. We omit ⊥ from the language. We call a formula positive if it contains only connectives from
{∧,∨,→,⊤}, and we refer to the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic as positive logic. We start by considering
a system defined by the axioms of positive logic, with the additional axiom (p ↔ q) → (¬p ↔ ¬q) defining the
behaviour of ¬. We call the resulting system N. We fix the positive logical fragment, and we strengthen the negation
operator up to reaching minimal propositional logic, which can be seen as the system obtained by adding the axiom
(p → q) ∧ (p → ¬q) → ¬p to positive logic [29]. An alternative axiomatization of minimal logic is obtained by
extending N with the axiom (p→ ¬p)→ ¬p [12, Proposition 1.2.5].
If we interpret ¬ as a ‘modality’, and disregard the fact that we consider extensions of positive logic, the basic
system N can be seen as an extension of classical modal logic (see [28]) which is based on the rule p↔ q /p↔ q.
Thus, N can be regarded as a weak intuitionistic modal logic that—as far as we know—has not been previously
studied. Note that extending it with more of the properties of a negation would lead to ‘very non-standard’ modal
logics. This relationship with modal logic will be further clarified towards the end of the paper, where the negation
will be interpreted by a full-fledged modal operator.
A first algebraic account of Johansson’s logic can be found in Rasiowa’s work on non-classical logic [29], where
the algebraic counterpart of minimal logic is identified as the variety of contrapositionally complemented lattices. A
contrapositionally complemented lattice is an algebraic structure 〈A,∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉, where 〈A,∧,∨,→, 1〉 is a rela-
tively pseudo-complemented lattice (which algebraically characterizes positive logic [29]) and the unary fundamental
operation ¬ satisfies the identity (x → ¬y) ≈ (y → ¬x). The variety presented by Rasiowa is term-equivalent to
the variety of relatively pseudo-complemented lattices with a negation operator defined by the algebraic version of
the principle of contradiction (x → y) ∧ (x → ¬y) → ¬x ≈ 1, originally employed in Johansson’s axiomatization.
Observe that Heyting algebras can be seen as contrapositionally complemented lattices where ¬1 is a distinguished
bottom element 0.
We further generalize the notion of Heyting algebra to that of an N-algebra. An N-algebra is an algebraic structure
A = 〈A,∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉, where 〈A,∧,∨,→, 1〉 is a relatively pseudo-completemented lattice and¬ is a unary operator
satisfying the identity (x↔ y)→ (¬x↔ ¬y) ≈ 1. The latter can be equivalently formulated as x∧¬y ≈ x∧¬(x∧y).
Note that this variety plays a fundamental role in the attempts of defining a connective over positive logic. In fact, the
considered equation states that the function ¬ is a compatible function (or compatible connective), in the sense that
every congruence of 〈A,∧,∨,→, 1〉 is a congruence of 〈A,∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉. This is somehow considered a minimal
requirement when introducing a new connective over a fixed setting (see, e.g., [9, 14]). Clearly, with every N-logic L
we can associate a variety of N-algebras. Each of these logics is complete with respect to its algebraic semantics [12].
Contrapositionally complemented lattices are the strongest structures that we consider here, and can be seen as the
variety of N-algebras defined by the equation (x → ¬x) → ¬x ≈ 1, or x → ¬x ≈ ¬x. We also consider
the two varieties of N-algebras defined, respectively, by the identity (x ∧ ¬x) → ¬y ≈ 1, and by the identity
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(x → y) → (¬y → ¬x) ≈ 1. They were studied in detail in [12], and we shall refer to the corresponding logics
as negative ex falso logic (NeF) and contraposition logic (CoPC). We point out that the logic CoPC has appeared
before under the name ‘Subminimal Logic’ with a completely different semantics ([16, 17], [18, Section 8.33]). It
was proved in [12, 13] that the following relations hold between the considered logical systems:
N ⊂ NeF ⊂ CoPC ⊂ MPC,
where the strict inclusion L1 ⊂ L2 means that every theorem of L1 is a theorem of L2, but there is at least one
theorem of L2 that is not provable in L1. Note the strict inclusion NeF ⊂ CoPC can be seen semantically (through the
semantics we introduce below), by taking 〈W,≤,N〉, withW := {w, v}, ≤ := {(w, v)}, and N(∅) = N(W ) := {v},
N({v}) :=W .
Recall that an intuitionistic Kripke frame F is a partially ordered set (briefly, poset) 〈W,≤〉, and a Kripke model
is a frame F equipped with a valuation V assigning to every propositional variable p ∈ Prop an upward closed subset
(upset) V (p) ∈ U(W,≤) of F where p is true. In the subminimal setting, we call an N-frame (sometimes we may call
it just a frame) a triple F = 〈W,≤,N〉, where 〈W,≤〉 is a poset and the function N: U(W,≤) → U(W,≤) satisfies,
for everyX,Y ∈ U(W,≤),1
N(X) ∩ Y = N(X ∩ Y ) ∩ Y. (1)
An N-model (sometimes we may call it just a model) is again a pair 〈F, V 〉, where F is a frame and V a valuation from
the set of propositional variables to U(W,≤). Given a model 〈F, V 〉, we define truth of positive formulas inductively
as in the intuitionistic setting, and say that a negative formula ¬ϕ is true at a node w, written 〈F, V 〉, w |= ¬ϕ,
if w ∈ N(V (ϕ)), where V (ϕ) := {w ∈ W : M, w |= ϕ}. We use the customary notation and write F |= ϕ if
〈F, V 〉, w |= ϕ holds for every w ∈ W and every valuation V . Note that F |= (p ∧ ¬p) → ¬q holds on a frame
satisfying property (1) if and only if X ∩ N(X) ⊆ N(Y ) for arbitrary upsetsX,Y , and F |= (p→ q)→ (¬q → ¬p)
holds if and only if the function N is antitone (i.e., X ⊆ Y implies N(Y ) ⊆ N(X)). The least element of a poset,
when it exists, is called a root, and we say that a frame is rooted if its underlying poset has a root. Given a poset
〈W,≤〉, we use R(w) to denote the set {v ∈ W : w ≤ v} of successors of w inW . In the rest of the paper, we refer
to this ‘Kripke style’ semantics for subminimal logics as N-semantics.
For a frame F = 〈W,≤,N〉, we define the corresponding neighbourhood frame Fn = 〈W,≤, n〉 by setting a
neighbourhood function n : W → P(U(W,≤)) to be n(w) := {X ⊆ W | w ∈ N(X)}. A model is again a pair
〈F, V 〉 consisting of a neighbourhood frame, and a valuation V defined in the same way as for the N-semantics. Then,
〈Fn, V 〉, w |= ¬ϕ if and only if V (ϕ) ∈ n(w) or, equivalently, w ∈ N(V (ϕ)), that is, 〈F, V 〉, w |= ¬ϕ. Conversely,
take a neighbourhood frame Fn = 〈W,≤, n〉 such that n : W → P(U(W,≤)) is a monotone function (i.e., if w ≤ v
then n(w) ⊆ n(v)) satisfyingX ∈ n(w) if and only ifX∩R(w) ∈ n(w) for every upsetX . The triple F = 〈W,≤,N〉
with N(X) := {w ∈ W | X ∈ n(w)} is an N-frame, and the two definitions are mutually inverse. It will become
clear in Section 5 that an approach using the N-semantics is helpful in practice. Further, the N-semantics is synergic
to the algebraic approach, as the next paragraph shows.
For an N-algebra A, we consider the set WA of prime filters of A, and let â := {w ∈ WA | a ∈ w}. Then the
triple FA = 〈WA,⊆,NA〉 is a frame, where
NA(X) := {w ∈WA | (∃¬a ∈ w)(R(w) ∩ â = R(w) ∩X)},
for any upsetX ∈ U(WA,⊆). This definition makes sure thatNA(̂b) for b ∈ A includes every filterw which contains
¬a, for any a ∈ A that is equivalent to b with respect to w (i.e., R(w) ∩ â = R(w) ∩ b̂). Observe that the notion of
prime filter in this context does not require the filter to be proper, i.e., the whole algebraA is always a prime filter. On
the other hand, starting from a frame F, we obtain an N-algebraAF = 〈U(W,≤),∩,∪,→,N,W 〉 whose universe is
the set of upsets of F equipped with the usual intersection, union, Heyting implication, and unitW , and with the unary
operator given by the function N. Note that the N-algebraA embeds into the N-algebraAFA via the map α : a 7→ â.
A consequence of this is that each valuation µ : Prop→ A onA gives rise to a valuation V = α ◦ µ on FA.
In order to obtain a full duality result between algebraic and frame-theoretic structures, in analogy with intuition-
istic logic we introduce general frames. A general frame is a quadrupleF = 〈W,≤,P ,N〉, where 〈W,≤〉 is a partially
1This property is equivalent to w ∈ N(X)⇐⇒ w ∈ N(X ∩R(w)) for every w ∈ W andX ∈ U(W,≤); see, e.g., [12, Lemma 4.3.1].
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Figure 1: The sequence ∆
ordered set, P ⊆ U(W,≤) containsW and is closed under ∪, ∩, Heyting implication→, and N: P → P satisfies
for all X,Y ∈ P , N(X) ∩ Y = N(X ∩ Y ) ∩ Y . Elements of P are called admissible sets. Note that ∅ need not be
admissible. We next recall the definition of refined and compact general frames, see e.g., [10] for analogous defini-
tions in the intuitionistic setting. If a general frame F is refined and compact, we call it a descriptive frame. Finally, a
top descriptive frame F = 〈W,≤,P ,N, t〉 is a descriptive frame whose partially ordered underlying set 〈W,≤〉 has a
greatest element t included in every admissible upset X ∈ P . Following [6], we call top model a pair 〈F, V 〉 where
F is a top descriptive frame and V is a valuation on F which makes every propositional variable true at the top node.
Every finite frame with a top node is a top descriptive frame with a set of admissible upsets {X ∈ U(W,≤) : X 6= ∅}.
It can be proved [12, 4] that the correspondence between F and AF, and between A and FA that holds for
every frame and N-algebra, in the case of top descriptive frames gives rise to a proper duality. More precisely,
given a top descriptive frame F = 〈W,≤,P ,N, t〉, the structure AF = 〈P ,∩,∪,→,N,W 〉 is the N-algebra dual
to F, and the set of prime filters of any N-algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉 induces a dual top descriptive frame
FA = 〈WA,⊆,PA,NA, A〉, where PA is the set {aˆ : a ∈ A}, and the map NA is defined as NA(â) = (̂¬a).
Moreover, we have F ∼= FAF and A
∼= AFA . Observe that the fact that prime filters of A do not need to be proper
ensures that the corresponding frame structure has a top element.
As in the case of Heyting algebras, for N-algebras there exists a one-to-one correspondence between congruences
and filters. We can therefore characterize subdirectly irreducible N-algebras as those N-algebras containing a second
greatest element, or equivalently, as those N-algebras A whose dual frame FA is a rooted top descriptive frame.
We call a top descriptive frame F finitely generated if AF is a finitely generated N-algebra, thereby obtaining a
completeness result for every N-logic with respect to the class of its finitely generated rooted top descriptive frames.
3. Continuum Many Logics
In this section, we construct continuum many N-logics by exporting and adapting techniques of [21, 19, 5]. We
start from a countable family of positive formulas that we adapt so to define uncountably many independent subsys-
tems of minimal logic containing the basic logic N.
Given two finite rooted posets F,G, we write F ≤ G if F is an order-preserving image of G, that is, if there is an
onto map f : G ։ F which preserves the order. This relation can be proved to be a partial order on the set of finite
(rooted) posets [5]. Consider the sequence∆ = {Fn | n ∈ N} of finite rooted posets with a top node (Figure 1). The
sequence∆ is obtained from the antichain presented in [3, Figure 2] by adding three nodes on the top. An argument
resembling the one in [3, Lemma 6.12] shows that the sequence ∆ is a ≤-antichain. We quickly sketch it here. If
f : Fn ։ Fm with n ≥ m is order-preserving, then the upset of Fm consisting of points of depth ≤ (m+ 1) must be
the image of the upset of Fn consisting of points of depth ≤ (m + 1). Thus, for xm+2 ∈ Fm, there is y ∈ Fn such
that f(y) = xm+2. But then, there is a z ∈ Fn such that y ≤ z and f(z) = ym+1. Since xm+2 6≤ ym+1, we get a
contradiction.
Lemma 3.1. The sequence∆ forms a ≤-antichain.
We call a map f : F → G between posets F = 〈W,≤〉 and G = 〈W ′,≤′〉 a p-morphism if f is order-preserving,
and f(w) ≤′ v implies the existence of w′ ∈ W such that w ≤ w′ and f(w′) = v. A partial p-morphism such
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that dom(f) is a downward closed set is called a positive morphism. We write F  G if F is a positive morphic
image of G. Assume F  G and let f be a positive morphism from G onto F. Extending f by mapping all the
points of G \ dom(f) to the top node of F, we obtain a total order-preserving map, yielding F ≤ G. This ensures the
≤-antichain∆ to be also a -antichain.
Lemma 3.2. If F  G and F is a finite rooted posets with a top node, then F ≤ G.
Having constructed the desired-antichain, we now proceed by adjusting the technique of Jankov-de Jongh formulas.
Recall that the universal model U(n) can be roughly thought of as the upper generated submodel of the descriptive
model dual to the free Heyting algebra on n ∈ N generators. The universal model (U⋆(n))+ for positive logic is
isomorphic to a generated submodel of U(n), and is a top model [5, 6]. It was shown in [6] that every finite rooted
poset with a top node, equipped with an appropriate valuation, is isomorphic to a generated submodel of (U⋆(m))+
for some m. Note that, for the frames Fn in Figure 1, it suffices to take m = 3. Hence, we call wn ∈ (U⋆(3))+ the
node in the positive universal model corresponding to the root of Fn. We can assume without loss of generality the
positive Jankov-de Jongh formula of Fn to be defined as follows [6]:
χ⋆(Fn) = ψ
⋆
wn
:= ϕ⋆wn →
r∨
i=1
ϕ⋆wni ,
where ϕ⋆wn , ϕ
⋆
wni
are defined as in [6] and wn ≺ {wn1 , . . . , wnr}. So, a rooted poset G refutes χ
⋆(Fn) if and only if
Fn  G. As ∆ is a -antichain, this means that, for every n,m ∈ N, the formula χ⋆(Fm) is valid on the poset Fn if
and only if n 6= m. In fact, the construction of ϕ⋆wn , ϕ
⋆
wni
ensures that the formula ϕ⋆wn is satisfied at the root wn in
(U⋆(2))+, while none of the formulas ϕ⋆wni is.
Lemma 3.3. For n,m ∈ N, the formula Fn |= χ⋆(Fm) if and only if n 6= m.
At this point, we are going to equip each rooted poset Fn with an appropriate functionNn to make it a top descriptive
frame. Moreover, we enhance the definition of χ⋆(Fn) in order to obtain formulas θ(Fn) with the same defining
property of the Jankov-de Jongh formulas for the signature of positive logic, but with the extra addition that the
formulas θ(Fn) are theorems of MPC. Given the rooted poset Fn, we consider the top descriptive frame 〈Fn,Nn, tn〉
where Nn has the propertyNn({tn}) = {tn}, the element tn being the top node of Fn. We denote the new family of
top descriptive frames 〈Fn,Nn, tn〉 by∆N . Now we consider a fresh propositional variable p, and define:
θ(Fn) := (p→ ¬p) ∧ ϕ
⋆
wn
→ ¬p ∨
r∨
i=1
ϕ⋆wni
.
We note that the formulas θ(Fn) are not the Jankov-de Jongh formulas for the considered signature. It is nonetheless
easy to see that, if n 6= m, the formula θ(Fn) is valid on the frame 〈Fm,Nm, tm〉. On the other hand, for checking
that 〈Fn,Nn, tn〉 6 θ(Fn) it is enough to consider a valuation V˜n extending Vn by V˜n(p) = {tn}. This way, the root
of Fn under the considered valuation makes (p→ ¬p) ∧ ϕ⋆wn true, while neither ¬p nor
∨r
i=1 ϕ
⋆
wni
is true at wn.
As a consequence, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.4. There are continuum many N-logics.
Proof. The fact that each θ(Fn) is a theorem of MPC ensures that for each subset Γ ⊆ ∆N , the logic
L(Γ) := N+ {θ(F) | F ∈ Γ}
belongs to the interval [N,MPC]. Finally, observe that for each pair of different subsets Γ1 6= Γ2 of ∆N , we have
L(Γ1) 6= L(Γ2). Indeed, without loss of generality we may assume that there is F ∈ Γ1 such that F /∈ Γ2. Moreover,
we have F 6 θ(F) and F  θ(G), for each G in Γ2. Therefore, there is a top descriptive frame F which is an L(Γ2)-
frame and not an L(Γ1)-frame. Since every N-logic is complete with respect to top descriptive frames, the latter
entails that L(Γ1) 6= L(Γ2).
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Observe that the choices of Nn and of the formula (p → ¬p) → ¬p that were made above are arbitrary among
the ones that ensure a proof of Theorem 3.4. This suggests the question what would have happened if we had made
different choices. As a matter of fact, the result of Theorem 3.4 can be refined as follows.
Proposition 3.5.
(1) There are continuum many N-logics between NeF and CoPC.
(2) There are continuum many N-logics below NeF.
(3) There are continuum many N-logics above CoPC.
Proof. The idea is to slightly modify the previous proof by choosing different theorems of minimal propositional
logic, and different functions Nn. Changing the former allows us to refine the result from above, while changing the
latter from below.
To prove (1), we consider posets Fn, but this time we consider the functionN
1
n defined by
N1n(X) :=
{
Wn \ {wn}, ifX 6=Wn \ {wn}
Wn, ifX =Wn \ {wn}.
Let p, q be fresh propositional variables. Consider the formulas
θ1(Fn) := (p→ q) ∧ ϕ
⋆
wn
→ (¬q → ¬p) ∨
r∨
i=1
ϕ⋆wni .
Observe that the frame 〈Fn,N1n, tn〉 is a frame of the logic NeF. In fact, if we consider an arbitrary w ∈ Wn such
that w ∈ X ∩ N1n(X) (this amounts to every w ∈ Wn \ {wn}), then w ∈ N
1
n(Y ) for every admissible upset Y .
Moreover, it is easy to see that, if n 6= m, the formula θ1(Fn) is valid on the frame 〈Fm,N1m, tm〉. On the other hand,
for checking that 〈Fn,N1n, tn〉 6 θ
1(Fn) it is enough to consider a valuation V˜n extending Vn by V˜n(p) = {tn} and
V˜n(q) =Wn \ {wn}. This way, the root of Fn under the considered valuation makes the whole antecedent of θ
1(Fn)
true (since V˜n(p) ⊆ V˜n(q)), while the consequent is not true at wn (since wn ∈ N1n(V˜n(q)), while wn 6∈ N
1
n(V˜n(p))).
A proof of (2) is obtained by considering functions:
N2n(X) :=
{
Wn \ {wn}, if X ⊂W,
Wn, if X =W,
and formulas
θ2(Fn) := (p ∧ ¬p) ∧ ϕ
⋆
wn
→ ¬q ∨
r∨
i=1
ϕ⋆wni ,
with fresh propositional variables p, q.
For (3), it is enough to define N3n(X) := {tn}, for every upsetX , and to use the formulas θ(Fn).
4. Filtration
The method of filtration is among the oldest and most used techniques for proving the finite model property
for modal and superintuitionistic logics. If a model refutes a formula ϕ, then the idea is to filter it out (identify
the points that agree on the subformulas of ϕ) to obtain a finite model that refutes ϕ. Thus the new model is a
quotient of the original one. The method of filtration was originally developed algebraically [24, 25], and later model-
theoretically [30, 23], see also [10]. In this section, we complete the results and constructions from [12], where the
finite model property was proved via model-theoretic filtrations applied to the canonical models only. A general
model-theoretic definition of filtration was missing in [12]. We give one here, which is a combination of the standard
filtration for intuitionistic logic [10] and the one for non-normal logic [11, 28]. Building on the ideas of [2, 3], we
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define algebraic filtrations for N-algebras. As in the modal and intuitionistic cases, we show, similarly to [2], that the
algebraic and model-theoretic methods turn out to be “two sides of the same coin”.
Let Σ be a finite set of formulas closed under subformulas. Given a modelM, we define an equivalence relation
∼ onW by considering, for w, v ∈ W :
w ∼ v if (∀ϕ ∈ Σ)(w ∈ V (ϕ)⇐⇒ v ∈ V (ϕ)).
Consider F∗ = 〈W ∗,≤∗,N∗〉, where W ∗ = W/ ∼, and ≤∗ and N∗ are, respectively, a partial order on W ∗ and a
function N∗ : U(W ∗,≤∗)→ U(W ∗,≤∗) satisfying the following conditions for all w, v ∈ W , X ∈ U(W ∗,≤∗) and
ϕ,¬ψ ∈ Σ:
(a) w ≤ v implies [w] ≤∗ [v];
(b) [w] ≤∗ [v] and w ∈ V (ϕ) imply v ∈ V (ϕ);
(c) [w] ∈ N∗(X) implies w ∈ N(pi−1(X)),
where pi−1(X) := {w ∈W : [w] ∈ X}; and
(d) w ∈ N(V (ψ)) implies [w] ∈ N∗(pi[V (ψ)]),
where pi[V (ψ)] := {[w] ∈W ∗ : w ∈ V (ψ)}. Finally, let V ∗ be a valuation on F∗ such that
V ∗(p) := {[w] ∈ W ∗ : w ∈ V (p)} = pi[V (p)],
for each p ∈ Σ. We callM∗ = 〈F∗, V ∗〉 a filtration of the modelM through Σ.
Theorem 4.1 (Filtration Theorem). Let M = 〈F, V 〉 be a model. Consider the filtration M∗ = 〈F∗, V ∗〉 of M
through a finite set Σ of formulas closed under subformulas. Then, for each ϕ ∈ Σ and w ∈W we have
w ∈ V (ϕ) iff [w] ∈ V ∗(ϕ).
Proof. We focus on the case ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. Consider w ∈ V (¬ϕ), i.e., w ∈ N(V (ϕ)). By induction hypothesis,
V ∗(ϕ) = {[w] : w ∈ V (ϕ)} = pi[V (ϕ)]. Hence, by (d), we are able to conclude [w] ∈ N∗(V ∗(ϕ)). On the other
hand, assume w 6∈ N(V (ϕ)). By induction hypothesis, V (ϕ) = {w : [w] ∈ V ′(ϕ)} = pi−1(V ∗(ϕ)). Therefore, by
(c), [w] 6∈ N∗(V ∗(ϕ)).
Among the filtrations of M = 〈W,≤,N, V 〉 through Σ, there always exists a greatest filtration. Consider the
partial order onW ∗ defined by:
[w] ≤g [v] if (∀ϕ ∈ Σ)(w ∈ V (ϕ)⇒ v ∈ V (ϕ)), (2)
and the map Ng(X) := {[w] ∈ W ∗ : w ∈ N(pi−1(X))}. It is easy to check that F g = 〈W ∗,≤g,Ng〉 is a frame
and M g = 〈F g, V ∗〉 is a filtration of M. Consider now an arbitrary filtration M∗ = 〈F∗, V ∗〉. Suppose [w] ≤∗ [v].
Then w ∈ V (ϕ) implies v ∈ V (ϕ). Moreover, observe that every upset of 〈W ∗,≤g〉 is an upset of 〈W ∗,≤∗〉.
Furthermore, for a given X ∈ U(W ∗,≤g) such that [w] ∈ N∗(X) we have then [w] ∈ Ng(X). To see this, assume
that [w] ∈ N∗(X). Then, by (c), w ∈ N(pi−1(X)) and hence, [w] ∈ Ng(X).
The rest of this section will be devoted to an algebraic development of the notion of filtration. Let Σ be a finite
set of formulas closed under subformulas, and consider an N-algebra with a valuation 〈A, µ〉, where µ : Prop → A.
Since Σ is finite, so is µ[Σ] as a subset of A. Let S be the (∧,∨, 1)-reduct of A generated by µ[Σ]. Observe that
(∧,∨, 1)-reducts are locally finite, i.e., every finitely generated (∧,∨, 1)-structure is finite. Hence, the resulting S is
finite and we can make S an N-algebra by equipping it with operations→S and ¬S defined as follows:
a→S b :=
∨
{s ∈ S | a ∧ s ≤ b}, (3)
and
¬Sa :=
∨
{s ∈ S | s ≤ ¬a}, (4)
for every a, b ∈ S. Note that ¬Sa ≤ ¬a, and ¬Sa = ¬a whenever ¬a ∈ µ[Σ], and a →S b ≤ a → b and
a →S b = a → b whenever a → b ∈ µ[Σ]. We call V the valuation V = α ◦ µ on FA, where α is defined as in
Section 2.
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Lemma 4.2. The subset S ⊆ A gives rise to a filtrationM∗
A
= 〈FA, V ∗〉 of the modelMA = 〈FA, V 〉 through Σ.
Proof. Define ∼ on WA by w ∼ v if and only if S ∩ w = S ∩ v. The first step amounts to proving that w ∼ v
is equivalent to w ∩ µ[Σ] = v ∩ µ[Σ]. The proof follows the one of [2, Lemma 2.5]. Observe that this first step is
clearly equivalent to w ∼ v if and only if (∀ϕ ∈ Σ)(µ(ϕ) ∈ w if and only if µ(ϕ) ∈ v), which in turn is equivalent to
(∀ϕ ∈ Σ)(w ∈ V (ϕ) if and only if v ∈ V (ϕ)).
Now, letW ∗
A
=WA/ ∼ and define [w] ≤∗ [v]⇐⇒ w ∩ S ⊆ v ∩ S, and
N∗(X) := {[w] ∈ W ∗
A
: w ∈ N(pi−1(X))},
forX ∈ U(W ∗
A
,≤∗). It is straightforward to see that F∗
A
= 〈W ∗
A
,≤∗,N∗〉 is a frame. Let now V ∗ be a valuation on
F∗
A
such that:
V ∗(p) := {[w] ∈ W ∗
A
: w ∈ V (p)}.
The structure 〈F∗
A
, V ∗〉 is a model, and it satisfies conditions (a)–(d).
The construction presented in Lemma 4.2 can be generalized as follows. Let 〈A, µ〉 be an N-algebra with a
valuation and Σ be a finite set of formulas closed under subformulas. Suppose that L is the universe of a finite
sublattice ofA with unit 1A such that µ[Σ] ⊆ L. Consider the N-algebra L = 〈L,∧,∨,→L,¬L, 1A〉, where→L and
¬L are defined as in (3) and (4). Let µL be a valuation on L such that µL(p) = µ(p) for each variable p ∈ Σ. We call
the pair (L, µL) a filtration of (A, µ) through Σ.
Theorem 4.3 (Filtration Theorem). If (L, µL) is a filtration of (A, µ) throughΣ, then µL(ϕ) = µ(ϕ) for each ϕ ∈ Σ.
Proof. The proof goes again by induction, and we focus on the case ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. But then, ¬µ(ϕ) = µ(¬ϕ) ∈ µ[Σ] ⊆ L.
Therefore, ¬µ(ϕ) = ¬Lµ(ϕ). Thus, µL(¬ϕ) = ¬µL(ϕ) = ¬µ(ϕ) = µ(¬ϕ).
Among the filtrations (L, µL) of (A, µ), the filtration (S, µS) is the least one. The following shows that (S, µS)
corresponds to the greatest filtration M
g
A
of MA through Σ. Consider [w], [v] ∈ W ∗A such that [w] ≤
g [v]. But then,
by (2), this means that (∀ϕ ∈ Σ)(w ∈ V (ϕ) ⇒ v ∈ V (ϕ)). This is again equivalent to w ∩ S ⊆ v ∩ S. Hence, we
conclude [w] ≤∗ [v].
5. Modal Companions
A normal extensionM of S4 is a modal companion of an intermediate logic L if for each propositional formula ϕ
we have L ⊢ ϕ iff M ⊢ ϕ, where ϕ is the Go¨del translation of ϕ. In this section we define (bi-)modal companions
of subminimal logics. The negation operator in N and its extensions behave like a non-normal modal operator which
suggests that bi-modal companions of subminimal logics must have a non-normal modal operator. For the theory of
non-normal modal logics and neighbourhood semantics we refer the reader to [11, 15, 28].
Consider the bi-modal languageL(Prop), where Prop is a countable set of propositional variables, generated by
the following grammar:
p | ⊥ | ⊤ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ | ϕ
where p ∈ Prop. We write ¬ϕ to denote the implication ϕ→ ⊥. Recall that the axioms and rules for the modal logic
S4 are:
(K) (p→ q)→ (p→ q);
(T) p→ p;
(4) p→ p,
in addition to all the classical tautologies, and the rules of modus ponens, uniform substitution, and necessitation
(p/p). Now, consider the following additional bi-modal axioms:
(p↔ q)→ (p↔ q), (5)
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p→ p. (6)
Note that the  modality is not a normal modality, since we do not have the rule of necessitation for it. As for the
notation, we denote the new modality as a box modality since it behaves as a universal modality from the point of
view of neighbourhood semantics. We denote this bi-modal system by NS4.
A neighbourhood frame for NS4 is a triple F = 〈W,≤, n〉, where 〈W,≤〉 is a set equipped with a reflexive
transitive relation ≤, and n a monotone function n : W → P(P(W )) (i.e., if w ≤ v then n(w) ⊆ n(v)) such that:
X ∈ n(w)⇐⇒ X ∩R(w) ∈ n(w). (7)
Using the fact that a neighbourhood function n induces the existence of a function N: P(W ) → U(W,≤) via the
equivalenceX ∈ n(w) if and only if w ∈ N(X), we consider the following generalization of N-semantics.
An N-frame for NS4 is a triple F = 〈W,≤,N〉, where 〈W,≤〉 is a set equipped with a reflexive transitive relation,
and N: P(W )→ U(W,≤) is a map such that:
w ∈ N(X)⇐⇒ w ∈ N(X ∩R(w)). (8)
An N-model for NS4 is a pairM = 〈F, V 〉, where F is an N-frame and V is a valuation V : Prop→ P(W ). Truth of
a formula is defined as follows:
M, w |= p ⇐⇒ w ∈ V (p);
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w |= ϕ andM, w |= ψ;
M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w |= ϕ orM, w |= ψ;
M, w |= ϕ→ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w |= ϕ impliesM, w |= ψ;
M, w |= ϕ ⇐⇒ R(w) ⊆ V (ϕ);
M, w |= ϕ ⇐⇒ w ∈ N(V (ϕ)),
where V (ϕ) := {w ∈ W : M, w |= ϕ}. A formula ϕ is said to be valid in a modelM ifM, w |= ϕ for every w ∈W ,
and ϕ is valid in a frame F if every model on F validates ϕ. We let F denote the class of all N-frames for NS4. We
will now show that NS4 is sound with respect to F .
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness). The system NS4 is sound with respect to F .
Proof. We only check the cases for the axioms (5) and (6), by proving that they are valid on each frame. The validity
of (6) follows immediately from the fact that N(X) is upward closed for every X ∈ P(W ). For (5), suppose that
〈F, V 〉, w |= (p ↔ q). This means that R(w) ⊆ V (p ↔ q), which is in turn equivalent to V (p) ∩ R(w) =
V (q) ∩R(w). In order to conclude 〈F, V 〉, w |= p↔ q, we assume without loss of generality that w ∈ N(V (p)).
By (8), this means that w ∈ N(V (p) ∩R(w)). But then, w ∈ N(V (q) ∩R(w)), since V (p) ∩R(w) = V (q) ∩R(w).
Thus, again by (8), we conclude w ∈ N(V (q)).
We now focus on showing that NS4 is complete with respect toF . To do this, we follow the standard approach for
normal modal logics (see, e.g., [10, 8]), and combine it with the standard approach for neighbourhood semantics [28].
Recall that a set Γ of formulas is said to be maximally consistent if it is consistent (in the sense that it does not contain
both ϕ and ¬ϕ, for any ϕ) and, for every formula ϕ, either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ. Every consistent set of formulas can
be extended to a maximally consistent set of formulas (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). As a consequence, it can be proved
that every formula that is contained in all maximally consistent sets of formulas is a theorem. Consider now the set
W of all maximally consistent sets of NS4 formulas. We denote by |ϕ| the set of all maximally consistent sets of
formulas containing ϕ. We define the canonical relation ≤ by: Γ ≤ ∆ if, whenever ϕ ∈ Γ, then ϕ ∈ ∆. A map
N : P(W)→ U(W ,≤) is a canonical N-function provided that for all ϕ ∈ L(Prop),
Γ ∈ N (|ϕ|)⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ Γ.
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We consider the canonical valuation V : Prop→ P(W) defined by
V(p) = |p| := {Γ ∈ W : p ∈ Γ}.
The quadruple 〈W ,≤,N ,V〉 is called a canonical model. To prove completeness of NS4, we use the following
function
N loc(X) := {Γ ∈ W | (∃ψ ∈ Γ)(X ∩R(Γ) = |ψ| ∩R(Γ))}.
which makesM = 〈W ,≤,N loc,V〉 into a canonical model, and its underlying frame into an NS4-frame. First of
all, it is easy to see that N loc satisfies (8). Further, the set N loc(X) is upward closed for every X ∈ P(W). In fact,
if ψ ∈ Γ, then also ψ ∈ Γ. But then, Γ ≤ ∆ implies ψ ∈ ∆. Since X ∩R(∆) = |ψ| ∩ R(∆), we conclude.
Moreover,M is canonical. In fact, Γ ∈ N loc(|ϕ|) implies that |ψ| ∩ R(Γ) = |ϕ| ∩ R(Γ) for some ψ ∈ Γ, which
means that for every successor ∆ of Γ, ϕ ↔ ψ ∈ ∆ and, therefore, (ϕ ↔ ψ) ∈ Γ. By the axiom (5) and the fact
that ψ ∈ Γ, we conclude ϕ ∈ Γ. A canonical function N is what ensures that membership and truth coincide in
the canonical model (Truth Lemma); the cases for the other formulas proceed by the standard induction.
Theorem 5.2 (Completeness). The system NS4 is complete with respect to F .
The next step is to show that NS4 is the modal companion of N. We start by recalling that it is possible to translate
formulas from the intuitionistic language into the modal language via the Go¨del translation:
⊥ = ⊥;
p = p;
(ϕ ◦ ψ) = ϕ ◦ ψ, where ◦ ∈ {∧,∨};
(ϕ→ ψ) = (ϕ → ψ).
The celebrated Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski theorem states that for every intuitionistic formula ϕ,
IPC ⊢ ϕ⇐⇒ S4 ⊢ ϕ.
The logic S4 is not the only modal companion of IPC (e.g., Grzegorczyk’s logic Grz is another well-known example).
A fundamental fact to be used in the proof is that any intuitionistic Kripke model M can be seen as a model for S4,
and for every node in the model the following holds:
M, w |= ϕ⇐⇒M, w |= ϕ
,
where |= denotes the intuitionistic and |= the modal notion of truth. Similarly, everyN-model has an equivalentNS4-
model, as any N-frame 〈W,≤,N〉 induces a corresponding NS4-frame 〈W,≤,N∗〉, with N∗ : P(W ) → U(W,≤)
defined by:
N∗(X) := {w ∈ W | (∃Y ∈ U(W,≤))(X ∩R(w) = Y ∩R(w) and w ∈ N(Y ))}.
We start by adapting the Go¨del translation in order to obtain a translation of N into NS4. It is sufficient to add a
translation clause for the negation in the language of N:
(¬ϕ) = ϕ,
and to discard the clause for ⊥. The following preliminary result is easy to prove.
Lemma 5.3. Let M = 〈W,≤,N, V 〉 be a model for N, and let M∗ = 〈W,≤,N∗, V 〉 be the corresponding N-model
for NS4 defined in the way explained above. Then, for every formula ϕ,
M, w |= ϕ⇐⇒M∗, w |= ϕ
,
where |= and |= are, respectively, the N and the modal notion of truth.
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In what follows, we allow ourselves to identifyϕ∧ψ and(ϕ∧ψ) for formulas ϕ and ψ, omitting thereby some
trivial steps in the derivations.
Theorem 5.4. For every formula ϕ ∈ L(Prop),
N ⊢ ϕ⇐⇒ NS4 ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. From left to right, we show that NS4 ⊢
(
(p ↔ q) → (¬p ↔ ¬q)
)
, that is, NS4 ⊢ 
(
(p ↔ q) →
(p↔ q)
)
. Indeed:
⊢ (p↔ q)→ (p↔ q) By axiom (5)
⊢ (p↔ q)→ (p↔ q) By necessitation
⊢ (p↔ q)→ (p↔ q) By (4)
⊢ (p↔ q)→ (p↔ q)
⊢ 
(
(p↔ q)→ (p↔ q)
)
By necessitation
For the other direction, suppose that there exists an N-countermodel of a formula ϕ. By Lemma 5.3, this leads to a
countermodel for ϕ in NS4, as desired.
The next part of the section aims for a better understanding of the bi-modal logic NS4 by studying the behaviour
of the modality resulting from the subminimal negation. We hence focus now on proving the following main result.
Theorem 5.10. The {∧,∨,→,}-fragment of NS4 is axiomatized by the following countably many rules:
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r)
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r)
Rn
for each n ∈ N.
In what follows, we call the logic axiomatized by this countable set of rules EN. This notation is justified by the
fact that classical modal logic is the non-normal modal logic axiomatized by:
p↔ q
p↔ q
and is denoted by E. From the perspective of the N-semantics, the defining rule of E is expressed by the fact that N
lifts to a well-defined function on sets.
First, we give a proof that each of these rules is derivable in NS4. For each rule, we provide a derivation of the
conclusion from the premise in NS4.
Lemma 5.5. The rule
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r)
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r)
Rn
is derivable in NS4, for each n ∈ N.
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Proof. The case n = 0 is clear. For n > 0, assume (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r). But then:
⊢ pi → pi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} By axiom (6)
⊢ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)
⊢ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn) (a)
⊢ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r) By necessitation
⊢ (q ↔ r)→ (q ↔ r) By axiom (5)
⊢ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r) (b)
⊢ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r) By (a) and (b)
As a consequence, we obtain the following partial result:
Lemma 5.6. Given a {∧,∨,→,}-formula ϕ,
EN ⊢ ϕ =⇒ NS4 ⊢ ϕ.
In order to conclude the proof of Theorem 5.10 we take an EN-countermodel for a {∧,∨,→,}-formula ϕ, and
build from it an NS4-countermodel for ϕ. Therefore, we first provide a completeness result for the logic EN.
Consider the modal N-frames 〈W,N〉 where, for every X,Y, Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ P(W ) and n ∈ N, the function
N: P(W )→ P(W ) satisfies (En):
N(X) ∩N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩N(Zn)=N(X ∩N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N(Zn)) ∩ N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N(Zn).
The corresponding notion of model is defined in the standard way. We next show that Rn is characterized by En.
Proposition 5.7. For any n ∈ N, a modal N-frame F = 〈W,N〉 satisfies En if and only if F |= Rn.
Proof. From left to right, consider a frame F = 〈W,N〉 satisfying En, and assume that for a given valuation V ,
〈F, V 〉 |= (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r).
This means that:
V (q) ∩ N(V (p1)) ∩ · · · ∩ N(V (pn)) = V (r) ∩ N(V (p1)) ∩ · · · ∩ N(V (pn)).
Now, suppose 〈F, V 〉, w |= p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn, that is,
w ∈ N(V (p1)) ∩ · · · ∩ N(V (pn)).
It is now sufficient to prove that w |= q if and only if w |= r. Indeed, without loss of generality, w ∈ N(V (q))
entails
w ∈ N(V (q)) ∩ N(V (p1)) ∩ · · · ∩N(V (pn)).
Further, by En we get
w ∈ N(V (q) ∩ N(V (p1)) ∩ · · · ∩ N(V (pn))) ∩N(V (p1)) ∩ · · · ∩ N(V (pn))
that is equivalent to
w ∈ N(V (r) ∩ N(V (p1)) ∩ · · · ∩N(V (pn))) ∩ N(V (p1)) ∩ · · · ∩ N(V (pn))
by our assumption. Therefore, by En again, w ∈ N(V (r)). It follows that F |= Rn.
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For the right-to-left direction, we assume F |= Rn, and suppose that there exist subsetsX,Y, Z1, . . . , Zn such that
N(X) ∩N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩N(Zn) 6=N(X ∩N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N(Zn)) ∩ N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N(Zn). (9)
Set V (pi) = Zi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, V (q) = X , and V (r) = X ∩ N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N(Zn), for propositional variables
pi, q, r. But then, V (pi) = N(Zi), V (q) = N(X) and
V (r) = N(X ∩ N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N(Zn)).
Take any w ∈ N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N(Zn). Obviously then w ∈ X is equivalent to w ∈ X ∩ N(Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N(Zn), and
hence, (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r) holds in F. But then, (p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r) holds in F as well by
Rn, which contradicts (9).
We conclude the completeness proof by means of a canonical model construction. Consider again the set W of
maximally consistent sets of {∧,∨,→,}-formulas. For any Γ ∈ W , set R(Γ) := {∆ ∈ W | ∀χ(χ ∈ Γ ⇒ χ ∈
∆)} and define
N (X) := {Γ ∈ W | (∃ψ ∈ Γ)(X ∩R(Γ) = |ψ| ∩ R(Γ))}, (10)
for anyX ∈ P(W). We need to prove that 〈W ,N〉 is an N-frame satisfying En for each n ∈ N. Consider a sequence
of subsets X,Z1, . . . , Zn ⊆ W , and take Γ ∈ N (Z1) ∩ . . . ∩ N (Zn). To show that En holds it will be sufficient to
prove
Γ ∈ N (X) if and only if Γ ∈ N (X ∩ N (Z1) ∩ · · · ∩ N (Zn)). (11)
By (10), Γ ∈ N (Z1) ∩ . . . ∩ N (Zn) means that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists ψi ∈ Γ such that
Zi ∩R(Γ) = |ψi| ∩ R(Γ). (12)
To prove (11), it suffices to show that∆ ∈ X∩R(Γ) implies∆ ∈ N (Zi) for every∆ ∈ W and every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
So, assume ∆ ∈ X ∩ R(Γ). But ∆ ∈ R(Γ) means, by (12), that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ψi ∈ ∆. Moreover,
R(∆) ⊆ R(Γ). So
Zi ∩R(∆) = Zi ∩R(Γ) ∩R(∆) = |ψi| ∩ R(Γ) ∩R(∆) = |ψi| ∩ R(∆),
and hence,∆ ∈ N (Zi) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} by (12) again. By defining now the canonical valuation as V(p) = |p|,
it is standard to prove that ϕ ∈ Γ if and only ifM,Γ |= ϕ, withM = 〈W ,N ,V〉. Therefore:
Proposition 5.8. The logic EN is sound and complete with respect to the N-models satisfying {En : n ∈ N}.
Now, we endow the canonical model of EN with a reflexive transitive relation so as to obtain an NS4-model. Set
Γ ≤ ∆ if and only if ∆ ∈ R(Γ). It is clear that N (X) ∈ U(W ,≤), for any X ∈ P(W). It suffices to show that
Γ ∈ N (X) is equivalent to Γ ∈ N (X ∩ R(Γ)), for Γ ∈ W . Indeed, we have Γ ∈ N (X ∩ R(Γ)) if and only if
X ∩ R(Γ) ∩ R(Γ) = |ψ| ∩ R(Γ) for some ψ ∈ Γ, that is, X ∩R(Γ) = |ψ| ∩ R(Γ). Therefore, Γ ∈ N (X). The
following is now immediate:
Lemma 5.9. Given a {∧,∨,→,}-formula ϕ,
NS4 ⊢ ϕ =⇒ EN ⊢ ϕ.
At this point, Theorem 5.10 follows from Lemmas 5.6 and 5.9.
Theorem 5.10. The {∧,∨,→,}-fragment of NS4 is axiomatized by the following countably many rules:
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r)
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q ↔ r)
Rn
for each n ∈ N.
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We conclude the section, and the whole article, with a brief sketch of how to obtain a modal companion for
contraposition logic CoPC. We recall that it is defined by the axiom (p → q) → (¬q → ¬p). We consider the
bi-modal logic CoS4 obtained by replacing the axiom (5) by
(p→ q)→ (q → p). (13)
The corresponding N-semantics is given by frames F = 〈W,≤,N〉, where 〈W,≤〉 is a poset, and N is antitone, i.e.,
forX,Y ∈ P(W ),
X ⊆ Y =⇒ N(Y ) ⊆ N(X).
The logic CoPC can be translated into the system obtained by replacing (5) by (13) via the translation defined at the
beginning of the section.
Theorem 5.11. For every formula ϕ we have
N ⊢ ϕ⇐⇒ CoS4 ⊢ (ϕ).
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, consider the translation of the axiom (p→ q)→ (¬q → ¬p), i.e., 
(
(p→
q)→ (q → p)
)
.We have:
⊢ (p→ q)→ (q → p) By axiom (13)
⊢ (p→ q)→ (q → p) By necessitation
⊢ (p→ q)→ (q → p) By (4)
⊢ (p→ q)→ (q → p)
⊢ 
(
(p→ q)→ (q → p)
)
By necessitation
For the reverse direction, it suffices again to observe that from any N-frame for CoPC we can obtain an N-frame for
CoS4.
We finish by highlighting a few further questions and research directions. First, it is reasonable to expect the
{∧,∨,→,}-fragment of CoS4 to be axiomatized by the following countably many rules
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (q → r)
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧pn)→ (r → q)
for n∈N, the argument being similar to the one for Theorem 5.10. This raises the question whether there exist finite
axiomatizations for the {∧,∨,→,}-fragments of the considered bi-modal systems.
More generally, the notion and properties of bi-modal companions of subminimal logics naturally lead to the
question whether the theory of modal companions of intermediate logics ([10, Section 9.6]) can be paralleled in this
case. For example, do there always exist the least and greatest bi-modal companions of subminimal logics? Can
one prove an analogue of the Blok-Esakia theorem in this setting? Also the study of the interplay between the two
modalities could be taken further through a comparisonwith widely studied non-normalmodal logics, such as classical
modal logic E and monotonic modal logic M.
Finally, it will be interesting to investigate the relations between our semantics for the logic CoPC and the one
proposed by Hazen [17].
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